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Abstract
Theoretically, populism has been conceptualized as a political ideology with three sub-
dimensions: anti-elitism attitudes, a preference for popular sovereignty, and a belief in
the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people. However, empirical research to date
has treated populist attitudes as a unidimensional construct. To address this issue, we
propose to conceptualize populist attitudes as a latent higher-order construct with
three distinct first-order dimensions. A -item inventory was developed using two
survey studies conducted in Switzerland in  and . Exploratory and confirma-
tory factor analyses were used to test the construct validity of this measure of populist
attitudes. The measurement that is proposed allows for a fine-grained study of popu-
list attitudes in the general public.
In the national elections of , , and , the citizens of European countries
such as Sweden, Finland, Poland, Denmark, and Austria have shown strong support
for populist parties and/or their candidates, as indicated by the proportion of voters
who sympathized with the Swedish Democrats (.%), the Finns (.%), the Law
and Justice Party (.%), the Danish People’s Party (.%), or the Freedom Party
of Austria (.%). Many authors are trying to identify the reasons for this growing
success of populist parties (Albertazzi & McDonnell, a; Mény & Surel, ;
Mudde, ). Voting for specific parties that are a priori categorized as populist has
lately been connected with a set of populist attitudes. These attitudes have been found
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to correlate positively with support for populist parties and movements (Akkerman,
Mudde, & Zaslove, ; Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde, ; Hawkins & Rovira
Kaltwasser, ). In research to date, populist attitudes have been conceptualized
as a unidimensional measure. However, we argue that a unidimensional model fails to
adequately describe populist attitudes, as it does not account for the different political
ideas that have been identified as distinct yet correlated facets of a populist ideology
(Mudde, ). Therefore, the present study proposes and tests a three-dimensional
hierarchical measurement of populist attitudes. Such a three-dimensional model is not
only able to identify populist attitudes in its entirety (i.e., attitudes indicating strong
support for all three dimensions) but can also distinguish between different varieties
of populist support (i.e., attitudes strongly supporting only one or two dimensions).
Populism as an Ideology
Authors frequently argue that populism is a ‘‘notoriously vague term’’ (Canovan,
, p. ), which entails a certain ‘‘conceptual slipperiness’’ (Taggart, , p. ).
Most recently, populism has been defined as a communication style (Jagers &
Walgrave, ), a political strategy (Weyland, ), and a political ideology
(Mudde, ). This study takes the last perspective, defining populism as a ‘‘thin-
centred ideology’’ (Mudde, , p. ) comprising a ‘‘set of political ideas’’
(Hawkins , p. ) about the structure of power in society (Albertazzi &
McDonnell, b). More precisely, according to the populist ideology, society has
a Manichean structure, as it is ‘‘ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’’’ and politics is noth-
ing but ‘‘an expression of the general will of the people’’ (Mudde, , p. ). With
that, populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology, which can become a thick-
centered ideology when it is combined with more complete ideologies, such as nativ-
ism—right-wing populism—or socialism—left-wing populism (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser ). From this definition, we extract three political ideas that together
form populism: () an anti-elitism approach, with elites seen as corrupt, betraying,
and deceiving the people; () a belief in unrestricted popular sovereignty that leaves
the power to the people; and () an understanding of the people as being homogenous
and virtuous (Wirth et al., ). When populism is conceived of as a set of political
ideas or as a multidimensional construct, researchers should operationalize and meas-
ure populist attitudes accordingly. In the following section, we argue that this has not
been followed with sufficient diligence in prior research on populist attitudes among
the general public.
Aside from two early attempts at the end of the twentieth century to identify
populist attitudes within the United States (Axelrod, ; Farrell & Laughin,
), it has only been recently that populist attitudes have received significant at-
tention from researchers. Akkerman et al., (; see also Hawkins et al., ) de-
veloped a one-dimensional conceptualization of populist attitudes. This measure
reflects two of the three key elements of populism identified above: popular sover-
eignty and an antagonism toward what is perceived to be an evil political elite. This
instrument has been tested in the United States (Hawkins et al., ), the
Netherlands (Akkerman et al., ), Chile (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, ),
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and recently also in Flanders (Spruyt, Keppens, & van Droogenbroeck, ). The
inventory comprises six items measuring populist attitudes (e.g., ‘‘The politicians in
Congress need to follow the will of the people’’). These researchers used principle
component analysis to demonstrate that populist attitudes form a single dimension
distinct from elitist and pluralist attitudes toward democracy. The successful replica-
tion of the model in three different countries leads to the conclusion that ‘‘populist
attitudes are widespread and latent’’ (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, , p. ). In a
construct validity test, the authors correlated the populism measure with demo-
graphic, social, and political indicators. In the Chilean case affiliates of leftist parties
showed stronger populist attitudes compared with partisans of rightist parties.
However, populist attitudes were unrelated to demographics (Hawkins & Rovira
Kaltwasser, ). In the Netherlands, populist attitudes were correlated with support
for parties that are often categorized as populist (i.e., the Socialist Party and the Party
for Freedom) (Akkerman et al., ). Additionally, it was shown that in the United
States, populist attitudes correlate positively with strong affiliations to either liberal or
conservative ideologies (Akkerman et al., ). A strength of these papers was to
show that populism is a concept that is distinct from other political ideologies, such as
elitism and pluralism. However, two problems with this conceptualization remain.
First, it lacks to depict the idea of the people as a homogenous group that is wise
and virtuous. Homogeneity and virtuousness are essential to the definition of popu-
lism as used in this research as well as in prior studies. Taggart () stresses the
importance of this idea by declaring the people as ‘‘the defining feature of populism’’
(p. ; emphasis in original). Following his explications and those of others, this
central feature of populism encloses more than the demand for popular sovereignty.
This aspect of people-centrism entails an understanding of a monolithic people that is
altogether good, honest, and upright. In this vein, the people share the same values
and interests. In addition, the people is seen as a coherent entity ready to withstand
any external threats (Albertazzi & McDonnell, a; Mudde, ). A measurement
that fails to consider this dimension is unable to fully grasp thin-centered populism.
Second, because of this conceptualization’s unidimensionality, it is impossible to
detect varieties of populist attitudes, such as the branch of populist thinking that
predominantly promotes the notion of a reified popular will and is less intensely
attached to the notion of a conspiring elite.
A Three-Dimensional Construct
Building on the prior research outlined in the preceding section, the present article aims
to develop a more finely grained inventory with which to measure the concept of
populism. Previous reasoning on populism suggests that the populist ideology is built
on three main political ideas. If we wish to measure the degree of individual support of
populism, an instrument is needed that delineates between support for each of these
three ideas. When a full populist is assumed to hold strong anti-elitism attitudes, a
strong belief in unrestricted popular sovereignty, and an understanding of the people
as being homogenous and virtuous, then populist attitudes can be conceptualized as a
second-order factor made up of these three distinct sub-dimensions as first-order factors.
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There are several reasons to suggest a three-dimensional structure of populist at-
titudes. First, the empirical measurement of a construct of interest should reflect all
facets that are derived from the underlying theory. When populist attitudes are
defined by three elements, then it is reasonable to expect three dimensions that are
part of a higher-order latent construct that represents populist attitudes. If one di-
mension was to be missing from the operationalization, the measurement would not
reflect all facets of populist attitudes, but rather an incomplete version of the ideology.
Second, if populism is conceptualized as a three-dimensional construct, then these
attitude dimensions can be activated in varying degrees in an individual mind. For
example, although there may be many people who hold anti-elitism attitudes, not all
of them favor popular sovereignty or perceive the people as a homogenous and vir-
tuous group. This reality is not reflected in a one-dimensional measure, which treats
individuals scoring high on one dimension as both, similar to individuals scoring high
on another dimension and to individuals scoring moderately on all dimensions.
Applying this logic, people who hold anti-elitism attitudes but who do not see
direct democratic procedures as a solution to compensate for the wrongdoings of
the political elite would be indistinguishable from individuals who show the opposite
pattern of attitudes—that is, who do not see the political elite as corrupt, but who
favor direct democracy. In treating populist attitudes as a single dimension, re-
searchers cannot distinguish between these two different views on politics. In contrast,
a three-dimensional measurement would enable the researcher to detect these different
attitude patterns.
The third advantage of a three-dimensional measurement is the more precise pre-
dictions it allows researchers to make. In the example given in the preceding para-
graph—describing people who hold anti-elitism attitudes yet who do not demand
popular sovereignty—the degree of populism within a given society could easily be
overestimated if a one-dimensional measure was used. Such an instrument could
identify individuals as populists even if they were in fact only dissatisfied with the
work of the current government. In contrast, an instrument based on a three-dimen-
sional conceptualization would require that individuals score sufficiently high on all
three dimensions to be considered to hold populist attitudes. Therefore, our assump-
tion is that populist attitudes are a latent second-order construct made up of three
lower-order dimensions: anti-elitism attitudes, a preference for unrestricted popular
sovereignty, and a belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people. We will
test this assumption on the basis of two separate data sets using exploratory and
confirmative factor analysis. To provide further evidence of construct validity, we
will include measures of elitist and pluralist attitudes into our analysis and contrast
these to the three populist attitude dimensions proposed before.
Method
Data and Procedure
To develop a scale for the three-dimensional structure of populist attitudes, two
surveys were conducted over the course of  months. The first study was an
online survey conducted in December  on a nation-wide sample of Swiss re-
spondents (N ¼ ). The second survey was conducted online in April , but
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based on a Swiss sample only taken from the city of Zurich and its surrounding
regions (N ¼ ,). In both studies, samples were recruited from online access
panels, applying a quota procedure with regard to age and gender. These samples
approach the population of interest’s characteristics in terms of age (national sample:
M ¼ .; SD ¼ .; regional sample: M ¼ .; SD ¼ .) and gender
(national sample: % female; regional sample: .% female).
Measurement
We examined populist attitudes by measuring three sub-dimensions: anti-elitism at-
titudes, demand for popular sovereignty, and belief in the homogeneity and virtuous-
ness of the people. The initial item pool comprised  items that were assumed to
reflect the three dimensions. Most of these items were taken from previous studies
and, thus, depicted anti-elitism and people’s sovereignty (Akkerman et al., ;
Hawkins et al., ; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, ). A literature review and
a preliminary analysis of news coverage containing populist communication led to
additional items tracing these two dimensions. This resulted in nine items reflecting
anti-elitism attitudes (anti) and another six items reflecting a demand for popular
sovereignty (sov). After consulting literature on the perception of in-group homogen-
eity and entitativity (Carpenter & Radhakrishnan, ; Lickel at al., ; Quattrone
& Jones, ), six items were chosen to assess the belief in a homogeneous and
virtuous people (hom). Across all three dimensions, various items depict the
Manichean perspective of populism by setting the entity of ‘‘the people’’ against
the entity of ‘‘the politicians’’ or the ‘‘government.’’ Survey participants rated all
items using -point Likert scales ranging from  ¼ strongly disagree to  ¼ strongly
agree (see Supplementary Tables A and A for question wording in English and
German).
Elitist attitudes were measured relying on three items that were taken from the
existing literature (Akkerman et al., ; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, ).
Partially, these items were rephrased to consistently refer to the idea that the political
elite (i.e., ‘‘the government’’ or ‘‘politicians’’) is in charge of important decisions and
not educated experts (i.e., ‘‘independent experts’’ and ‘‘successful business people’’).
Pluralist attitudes were measured using four items. Two indicators were taken from
previous studies (Akkerman et al., ; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, ), and
two items were added to also depict acknowledgment of minority views and opposing
views in society (see Supplementary Table A for question wording).
Results
The  items from the populism scale were submitted to an exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) using the promax rotation method. The results of the factor analysis relying on
the data from the national sample revealed a three-dimensional structure. To optimize
the solution, items were excluded when communalities or factor loadings were too low
or when items loaded on more than one factor. This process was then stopped before
factors reached an item number lower than four. At the end of this process,  items
remained: five items that reflect an anti-elitism attitude, four items that refer to the
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sovereignty of the people, and six items that expressed a belief in a homogeneous and
virtuous people. These items share variance to a high degree (KMO ¼ .). The
three factors together account for % of the variance (Factor  ¼ %; Factor  ¼
%; Factor  ¼ %, eigenvalues ¼ ., ., ., respectively). Factor loadings
ranged between . and .. Homogeneity items loaded strongly on the first factor,
anti-elitism items on the second factor, and sovereignty items on the third factor. No
serious cross-loadings occurred, and reliability was satisfactory for all three factors (see
Supplementary Table A, also for communalities, mean values, and SDs). Using the
data from the regional sample, the analysis was replicated and resulted in the same
factor structure (Supplementary Table A). Thus, preliminary exploratory factor ana-
lyses support the assumed three-dimensional structure of populist attitudes.
Interestingly, these analyses led to the exclusion of some of the items used in previous
studies (Akkerman et al., ; Hawkins et al., , ); these items were all
replaced by new items. However, four of six items (items , , , and ) used in
prior studies were retained in the updated version of the measure.
To test the robustness of this factor structure, the dimensionality of populist atti-
tudes was further examined in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using the R ..
package lavaan (Rosseel, ). This was done for both the national and regional
sample. Populist attitudes were modeled as a second-order factor with three proposed
distinct sub-dimensions. Items were permitted to load only on the factors they were
expected to load on. A first test of a three-dimensional second-order factor model
with the national data indicated an acceptable fit (2¼ ., df ¼ , p  .;
comparative fit index ¼ .; root mean squared error of approximation ¼ .).
To improve model fit, modification indices were examined. The output indicated that
three items caused problems (i.e., high covariation with other items on their factor
and even with items across factors). These three items were excluded from the ana-
lysis. The resulting model showed a better fit to our data (Table , Panel A). All
items load substantially (loadings higher than . in all cases) on their hypothesized
latent factors. Furthermore, the latent first-order factors show significant loadings on
the proposed second-order factor that represents populist attitudes (Table , Panel B).
This result is in line with the hypothesis that populist attitudes are a latent higher-
order construct made up of the three lower-order dimensions of anti-elitism attitudes,
a preference for unrestricted popular sovereignty, and a belief in the homogeneity and
virtuousness of the people.
To further corroborate the validity of this conceptualization of populist attitudes,
two additional steps were taken. First, the three-dimensional second-order factor
model was compared with two one-dimensional models of populist attitudes. The
first single-factor model included the six items from Akkerman et al. (). As we
have implemented the full six-item set only in the national survey, the model could
only be estimated for this data set. The second one-dimensional model used the -
item set introduced above. This model was estimated on the basis of both available
data sets. These one-factor models assume that the covariance among the items can be
accounted for by a single latent variable, as implied by existing operationalizations of
populist attitudes (Hawkins et al., ). The fit statistics in Panel A of Table 
indicate that a hierarchical multidimensional model of populist attitudes is superior to
all three one-dimensional models.
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Second, we used  populism items from the regional data set to test whether
populism, elitism, and pluralism are distinct constructs. This analysis resulted in five
factors, each of which always only comprised items of one specific construct with
loadings higher than . and cross-loadings lower than . (see Supplementary Table
A). Finally, CFA yielded that both, elitism and pluralism, correlate negatively with
all three sub-dimensions that we have conceptualized (anti-elitism and elitism: r ¼
., p < .; anti-elitism and pluralism: r ¼ ., p < .; sovereignty and elitism:
r ¼ ., p < .; sovereignty and pluralism: r ¼ .; p ¼ .; homogeneity and
elitism: r ¼ ., p ¼ .; homogeneity and pluralism: r ¼ ., p < .; N ¼
,). In sum, the more participants agreed to either one of the three populism
dimensions, the less they endorsed elitist or pluralist attitudes. These results provide
evidence that the present threefold conception of populism is a valid construct that is
distinct from other conceptions of democracy, that is, elitism and pluralism.
Discussion
Research on measuring populism in public opinion surveys has grown in the past
decade because of the rise of populist parties in Western democracies. The present
article introduces a refined instrument for measuring populist attitudes. From extant
definitions of populism as a thin ideology, we inferred three dimensions: an anti-elitism
approach, the belief in unrestricted popular sovereignty, and an understanding of the
people as being homogenous and virtuous. A rigorous empirical test using different data
sets clearly demonstrates that a second-order model with three dimensions of populism
is superior to a one-dimensional conceptualization in a number of ways.
First, as our major goal was to create a theoretically sound and exhaustive instru-
ment to measure populist attitudes, we followed a deductive approach: operationaliza-
tion was strictly derived from a broadly accepted definition of populism, from which
the three most important notions underlying the theoretical concept were extracted.
Second, the robustness of the three-dimensional second-order factor model was suc-
cessfully tested using CFA. In prior studies, only exploratory factor analyses were
used. However, EFA is not suitable for construct validity testing. All items are
assumed to load on all factors, making CFA more appropriate for testing hypotheses
that incorporate the dimensionality of populist attitudes. The analysis revealed three
distinct dimensions that are positively correlated with each other and belong to one
higher-order latent construct—that is, populist attitudes. Third, the successful repli-
cation of the model in two independent samples—the findings from both the national
and regional samples confirmed the hypothesized model structure—further increases
the credibility of the present approach. Fourth, in a final step of validation, we
showed that all three populist attitude dimensions are also distinct from elitist and
pluralist attitudes.
Finally, looking at possible applications of this instrument in future research, this
tool allows researchers to investigate specific research questions. Researchers may
want to examine to what extent affiliation to populist parties stems from anti-elitism
attitudes, a general support of the idea of popular sovereignty, the perception of the
people as homogenous and virtuous, or a combination of these dimensions. Prediction
of vote choice can be further improved by adding a specific political ideology (i.e., left
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or right wing) as a fourth dimension to the model. The three dimensions measure the
thin-centered ideology of populism; yet, the model is flexible enough to be extended
to measure thick forms of populism as well. Furthermore, regarding a large corpus of
research dealing with populist communication in media content (Akkerman, ;
Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, ; Rooduijn, ; Wirth et al., ), this
new instrument enables researchers to trace specific communication effects on the
three attitude dimensions, as not all populist statements found in the media will
influence all of the three dimensions in the same way.
The present analysis also carries limitations. Data were collected using online access
panels from only one country, and online surveys always carry a high risk of partici-
pants being distracted while filling out the questionnaire or quickly clicking through
the questions without paying real attention to the content. We therefore recommend
that future studies replicate the present findings using different samples and survey
modes. Furthermore, this study was conducted in Switzerland, where a direct dem-
ocracy is practiced. As this is exceptional among Western democracies, the instru-
ment—developed for international research—should be tested in other countries as
well. Moreover, we did not study how populist attitudes are related to vote choice or
sociodemographic variables. Thus, another avenue for follow-up research would be to
look at how the updated measure predicts vote choice or party affiliation, further
corroborating the construct validity of the present measure.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary Data are available at IJPOR online.
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